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I will include extracts related to Stanley Camp, and other civilians at large in Hong Kong. The full documents can be accessed in the Elizabeth Ride Collection.
Thanks to Elizabeth Ride for answering the following questions in such detail:
Q1. I've heard you call them "quiz" reports. Where did that name come from?
They were called 'KWIZ': This was short for Kweillin Weekly Intelligence Summary, with a 'Z' substituted for an 'S'. I have a letter from my father to the Military Attache explaining this but my papers are not to hand at the moment.
Q2. Who prepared these reports, and where did the information come from?
To answer these questions I quote a piece from my father's report to the War Office in 1946, (which is incidentally being printed as the next volume in my BAAG series):
(a) Obviously the first problem in setting up a new E. & E. organization was to collect information concerning the enemy and the Ps/W Camps in HONG KONG. Unfortunately the surrender of HONG KONG had temporarily dislocated the British secret intelligence organization in S.CHINA, and hence the B.A.A.G. was forced to devise ways and means of collecting its own information. In addition to this our directive (see Appendix II) definitely required us to appoint an I.O. and “to collect, collate and disseminate all kinds of intelligence” and to forward periodically collated summaries to the Military Attaché.
(b) Our intelligence was obtained in two main ways: by the systematic and routine interrogations of the large numbers of Chinese refugees arriving in China from occupied territory, and by the employment of agents.
(c) In the initial stages of our existence, most of the work was done at our Advanced H.Q. at WAICHOW and the reports were embodied in the WAICHOW INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (W.I.S.) which was published weekly and passed to the Military Attaché CHUNGKING and the D.M.I., G.H.Q. NEW DELHI.
This was a very bad arrangement because reports were three weeks or more old by the time they reached CHUNGKING or NEW DELHI, but it was the best we could do at that time because we did not have permission to use either W/T or Ciphers. Urgent intelligence was sent via Chinese telegraph in a clear code arranged between the O.C. A.H.Q. and the Commandant at H.Q., an obviously most unsatisfactory procedure. Even then telegrams took 5-7 days to reach our H.Q.
(d) With the establishment of a second forward post at SAMFAU (22/25N, 112/42E) south of CANTON, we began to tap the area stretching from MACAO in the East to KWANG CHOW WAN and HAINAN in the West, and our H.Q. at KWEILIN was able to interrogate refugees who had come out of FRENCH INDO-CHINA, from as far afield as SIAM and MALAYA, and also refugees from SHANGHAI. KWEILIN was the common meeting ground of the routes from all these occupied areas leading to CHUNGKING.
(e) To deal with this ever-increasing flow of intelligence from these additional areas, an Intelligence Section had to be set up at H.Q. It comprised:- translation personnel for dealing with Japanese, Chinese and French papers, documents, periodicals and books; draftsmen for reproducing maps, sketches, diagrams, outlines of enemy ships etc.; confidential clerks for the typing, and I.O.’s for the collating, grading and production of the reports in final form. The reports were published in the KWEILIN WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (K.W.I.Z.) which superseded the W.I.S. (Waichow Intelligence Summary) The lay-out of K.W.I.Z. and the distribution of the various sections are given in Appendix IV.
(f) In 1943, permission was given by the Chinese for the use of W/T. This meant that reports from HONG KONG could be at H.Q. in 3 – 4 days instead of two weeks as before. Those of operational value were immediately passed to the U.S.A.A.F. 68th Composite Wing H.Q. at KWEILIN who came to depend on us more and more for information from the HONG KONG – CANTON AREA.
Q3. Who received the summaries, and how did they benefit from them?
This distribution list shows who received copies of the Summaries. Please let me know if you want explanations of the initials.:
KWIZ DISTRIBUTION LIST – JANUARY 1945
(Showing number of copies of each Section distributed)
Here are some of the opinions of BAAG I have collected, demonstrating how valuable these Summaries were:
The contents of the divisions I to VI in the Distribution List are as follows:
SECTION I - Ps W, Internees, Escapers, Evaders
(a) Camps: Information affecting conditions, food, health, morale, attempted and possible escapes, distribution and movement of Ps W and Internees etc.
(b) Reports from Escapers, Evaders, Refugees; letters from occupied Territory.
SECTION II - General Intelligence
(a) Shipping – Naval and Merchant.
(b) Air Force – Targets.
SECTION III - Non-military Intelligence
(a) Political – administration.
(b) Economic data, transport, railways, roads, medical, scientific, Religion, education.
(c) Japanese propaganda, atrocities, secret service activities, blacklist, personalities etc.
SECTION IV – Chinese Intelligence
SECTION V - Intelligence for Press Attaché
(a) Translations of articles from newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets from enemy occupied areas.
SECTION VI - Indians
(a) Military personnel – PsW, location, morale, etc.
(b) Indian National Army – Traitors etc.
(c) Civilians – personalities.
(d) Indian Independence League, Indian Affairs Office.
(f) Escaper and Refugee reports.
I asked about the difference in numbering between WIS and KWIZ. Elizabeth Ride replied:
The discrepancy in numbering is because we are dealing with two different Intelligence Summaries - Waichow Intelligence Summary (WIS) and Kweilin Weekly Intelligence Summary (KWIZ).
The first KWIZ (KWIZ #1) was produced on 17.5.1943, mainly, I suspect, on the recommendation of Lt Col Ridgway of GHQ India. I quote from the last page of his report (WO 208/3498) in 1943: "In view of the fact the Intelligence comes to Ride's HQ from several directions besides Waichow it is suggested that the provision of a trained I.O. at Kweilin would enable them to produce a Kweilin Summary instead of a Waichow Summary, wireless being used to pass back information of immediate importance". Section I of KWIZ contained "All information connected with prisoners-of-war, internees, third nationals, etc."
The last WIS (WIS #72) was produced in May 1944.
Elizabeth Ride writes:
These agents all did unbelievable service, every one of them. One day you might have use for what my father wrote about them:
"Hongkong's war did not cease with the surrender of her fighting forces in December 1941, but few realize to what extent we can be justificably proud of the daring deeds of her children, performed during the following period of sustained war effort of which the 18 days of battle was but the prologue. It was Hongkong's own contribution to the final defeat of Japan.
"The aim of this band of men and women was to serve as best they could for the ultimate resoration of the homes and the communities which they and their forebears had built up and which they had grown to love and revere.
"They were resolved to carry on their fight agsinst the Japanese after the defeat of the Colony's regular defenders. This new fight of theirs was not a fight of foxholes and mortars, of ack-ack guns and jungle defence: it was a long, sustained fight of stoical courage an endurance, of intrigue and counter-intrigue, of matching their wits against a cunning foe and, last but not least, of gambling with high stakes for duty's reward alone."
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